stabilisation of the Polish party system around the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide.
However, other factors pointed to the dangers of declaring that the Polish party system was 'frozen' around these two blocs and suggested that it remained vulnerable to further shocks and re-alignments. This was exemplified by the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement in this election which was able to mobilise a constituency that went beyond the existing anti-clerical electorate and represented a genuinely new phenomenon in Polish politics, although it was questionable whether, given its potential structural weaknesses and limitations of its appeal, this new party would be the long-term beneficiary of any revival on the Polish left. This was a remarkable and unprecedented record in Polish politics which was more accustomed to the rise and disappearance of governing parties. Although the nature of popular support for the government was often very shallow, Mr Tusk's administration generally had more declared supporters than opponents and throughout the period the prime minister remained one of Poland's most popular politicians. Polish voters clearly warmed to his apparently consensual style compared to that of Mr Kaczyński, his more combative predecessor. For example, a January 2011 CBOS survey found that 40% of respondents felt that the Tusk government had improved the lives of Polish citizens, compared to only 25% who felt that about the previous Law and Justice administration. 3 A June 2011 GfK Polonia survey also found that, although only 22% felt positively about the Civic Platform-led government and 34% evaluated it negatively (40% were neutral); this compared with the 74% who felt negatively about its Law and Justice-led predecessor at the end of its term of office. 4 Civic Platform and Law and Justice thus had an apparent 'lock' on the Polish electorate and within that duopoly Mr Tusk's party appeared to have an in-built majority. to secure the 5% vote share required to obtain parliamentary representation. However, the party more than held its own in the October-November 2010 regional assembly elections when it came third with over 16% of the vote nationally. 6 The Civic Platform-Peasant Party coalition was much more cohesive than most of its predecessors; indeed, this was probably one of the most stable governments in post-1989
Poland. The key to its stability was the political partnership between Mr Tusk and Peasant
Party leader Waldemar Pawlak, who held the office of deputy prime minister and economy minister. The two leaders were generally able to defuse tensions and problematic issues before they became too contentious or escalated into major public disputes. This was helped by the fact that the Peasant Party was primarily an office-seeking party with a clearly defined rural-agricultural electoral constituency, making it a pragmatic negotiating partner with a fairly narrow policy agenda. For example, a May 2011 CBOS survey found that by far the most important reason cited by Peasant Party voters for supporting the party (by 46% of respondents) was the fact that it represented and defended the interests of people like themselves; other parties' voters rarely if ever cited this as a reason. 7 Importantly, the fact that the two parties had somewhat different core electorates and bases of support, with the Civic Platform primarily an urban party and the Peasant Party's voters drawn mainly from rural communities, meant that they were not in direct competition for the same voters. The
Peasant Party also appeared to have drawn lessons from earlier periods as a member of coalition governments during the 1990s and early 2000s when it was a very difficult partner and distanced itself publicly from the main ruling party whenever its poll ratings declined or the government encountered difficulties. However, this time around Mr Pawlak's party pursued a very different strategy: making a virtue of its predictability and self-consciously trying to project an image as a constructive and moderating force in Polish politics. 8 At the same time, it concentrated on 'delivering' for its core rural-agricultural electorate both in terms of policy -by, for example, protecting the heavily state-subsidised farmers social security system -and through its control of government-appointed posts and agencies, especially in the agricultural sector. 9 As long as Civic Platform was careful not to push ahead too quickly with policy reforms that threatened to undermine the interests of the Peasant Party's core farming constituency, or on other issues where it felt that it might not have been able to count on its partner's support, then the coalition functioned smoothly.
Nonetheless, Civic Platform's support was shallow and not based on any particular enthusiasm for the government or its policies. For sure, Mr Tusk's administration was generally felt to have done a competent job and took credit for ensuring that Poland was the only EU member that came through the first wave of the global financial crisis in 2008-9
without falling into recession. However, although Civic Platform had made a bold campaign pledge in the 2007 election that it would deliver an 'economic miracle', fearing the political consequences Mr Tusk's government failed to capitalise on its electoral mandate and move ahead quickly with the more radical social and economic policy reforms that were advocated by many analysts as necessary for the party to live up to its promises. As a consequence, the government was heavily criticised, even by its own supporters, for its lack of major achievements and ambition. 10 This led to a steady erosion in the government's public approval ratings and satisfaction with its performance. For example, a January 2011 CBOS survey found that 72% of respondents felt that the government had failed to implement its election promises, 69% did not trust government information on important political and economic matters, 66% felt that it avoided difficult decisions and 60% that it avoided tackling the most important issues facing the country. dynamic (61%), hard-working (47%) and competent (45%), they also felt that he had not fulfilled their expectations. This could be seen clearly in the fall, compared with his first year in office, in the number who felt that the prime minister was decisive (from 57% to 37%), confronted difficult issues (from 50% to 33%), was consistent and determined (from 48% to 28%), and delivered on his promises (from 35% to 17%).
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In its defence, the government's supporters argued that, initially at least, it was hugely constrained by the fact that it had to 'co-habit' with President Lech Kaczyński, the Law and Civic Platform also used its tenth-anniversary convention to highlight that it was winning over new converts from rival parties, as well-known figures from across the political spectrum declared their intention to run on the party's candidate lists. 34 Thus, one of the convention highlights was a speech by Mrs Kluzik-Rostkowska, perhaps the most controversial of the 'switchers', where she declared that she would be leaving 'Poland is the Most Important' to support Civic Platform. 35 At the other end of the political spectrum, the convention also the saw the accession to the party of well-known centre-left politicians, Civic Platform's victory was due, in part, to its ability to craft an extremely broad appeal and identify itself skilfully with mainstream public opinion. However, given that the size of the two main parties 'core' electorates was roughly similar, 53 one of the main factors determining the election outcome was always likely to be the level of turnout. Many observers felt that a lower turnout would benefit Law and Justice whose core supporters were more highly motivated and easier to mobilise than Civic Platform's less disciplined voters. For example, a June-July 2011 CBOS survey found that 69% of Law and Justice voters said that they were certain to vote for that party (increasing to 76% when including those who were almost certain) compared to only 56% of Civic Platform voters. 54 The same survey found that 42% As Table 1 also shows, the Peasant Party won 8.36% of the vote, finishing fourth among the five parties that crossed the 5% threshold, and 28 seats in the new Sejm. This gave the governing coalition 235 seats in total, enough to secure a small but workable parliamentary majority. Although some party leaders had hoped for more, 59 this was a relatively good result for the agrarian party given that many opinion polls during the campaign (and, indeed, previous parliament) showed its support hovering around the 5% mark, and it was the first time that the party had managed to broadly hold on to its share of the vote after a period in office. In fact, as Apart from the re-election of Mr Tusk's government, the other major story of this election was the success of the Palikot Movement, an anti-clerical liberal party formed less than a year before by the controversial and flamboyant businessman and former Civic Platform deputy Janusz Palikot. As Table 1 shows Until the final stages of the election, support for the Palikot Movement stood at a mere 1-3%.
However, Mr Palikot ran a dynamic and extremely well executed campaign trying to move beyond his frivolous image and present himself as a serious political leader and intellectual.
For example, a November 2011 CBOS report showed how the number of voters who said that they trusted Mr Palikot increased from 24% in August 2011 to 36% in October, while the number who distrusted him fell from 46% to 36% over the same period (although by November the numbers had returned to their pre-election levels proved to be a false dawn and the party lost ground as it struggled to find an effective response to the series of high profile defections to Civic Platform by prominent left-wing politicians such as Mr Arłukowicz. 68 Mr Napieralski became too self-confident after his surprisingly good presidential election result and, as a consequence, when drawing up the party's election candidate lists paid more attention to internal party manoeuvring than choosing candidates who could attract broad support. 69 It is easy to forget that the Civic Platform-Law and Justice duopoly emerged conjecturallyindeed, almost accidentally -in 2005 and that originally the socio-demographic profiles of the two party electorates (and, arguably, many of their policies) were actually very similar. 74 Indeed, at the time they were seen as natural coalition partners. However, the fact that this divide not only endured but strengthened and went on to dominate and structure the Polish political scene for the next six years suggested that it was more authentic than might have originally appeared. 75 Indeed, as the divisions between the two party elites widened and deepened so did those between their electorates, exemplified by the decline in Civic Platform and Law and Justice voters who put the other party as their second voting preference from 45% and 37% respectively in July 2005 to only 3% and 6% in June-July 2011. 76 The same June-July 2011 CBOS survey found that 75% of Civic Platform voters said that they would definitely not vote for Mr Kaczyński's party and 68% of Law and Justice voters said the same about Mr Tusk's (even more than the 48% who said that they would not vote for the Democratic Left Alliance). 77 Moreover, while it may not have done so originally, there was also some evidence that the Civic Platform-Law and Justice divide increasingly reflected and mapped onto deeper ideological and socio-cultural divisions 78 and that the two electorates' social bases were becoming somewhat more clearly defined: with Law and Justice voters older, more rural and religious, and less well educated and Civic Platform supporters younger, more urban, better off, better educated, and more secular. 79 In fact, in many ways, the deep political polarisation and bitterness that characterised the two parties' on-going rivalry meant that they became the main points of reference for each other, with the existence of (and repellence from) the other being the key to their political appeal; and possibly even very existence. 80 At the same time, as Fourthly, and more profoundly, arguably the 'ideological glue' holding Civic Platform and Law and Justice together was much weaker than might have appeared on the surface. These parties' long-term future cohesion depended upon their ability to frame the kind of broad, integrative ideological narratives which play a crucial role in holding broad parties together, and provide a sustainable basis for the development of, durable, diverse and heterogeneous political formations. They frame political action, give such parties purposiveness and identity as political organisations, and socialise incoming leadership elites thereby helping diverse political formations in post-communist states to hold together, particularly when they encounter periods of political crisis. 91 Although both Civic Platform and Law and Justice had at various points in their short histories attempted to develop more complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation it was questionable whether they had succeeded in doing so.
Arguably, and surprisingly given that the party just achieved a historic second consecutive election victory, it was Civic Platform that always had the relatively weaker ideological underpinnings. Initially, the party had attempted to profile itself as a modernising form of pro-market, right-wing liberalism focusing on economic issues (its early flagship policy was introducing a 15% 'flat tax') and subsequently incorporated a national-patriotic appeal and moderate form of social conservatism (even elements of Euroscepticism). However, whom Civic Platform had, on occasions, had a rather uneasy relationship. 93 In other words, as discussed above, in the 2007-11 parliament the party adopted a deliberate strategy of diluting its profile in pursuit of electoral success and dominance and increasingly became a nonideological ('post-political' to use the Polish term) 'party of power'. However, while Civic Platform's ability to garner the support of broad swathes of the electorate in opposition to a polarising challenger clearly provided it with an extremely effective short-term electionwinning strategy, this success was conjunctural. It also moved the party away from developing the kind of integrative ideological underpinning that would have provided it with a firmer basis for more enduring, long-term organisational stability. In other words, Civic
Platform began to lose its sense of common purpose and mission as it developed into an (arguably) unfeasibly broad political construct making it more vulnerable to implosion if it faced a serious internal crisis.
At one point Law and Justice's 'Fourth Republic' project of wide ranging moral and political renewal did potentially appear to provide the party with just such an integrative ideological narrative. For sure, as noted above, the 'Fourth Republic' project developed extremely negative connotations and came to be used increasingly as a tool for mobilising those Polish voters who found Mr Kaczyński's party too confrontational. Nonetheless, however distorted and cynical its critics might have argued that it was, it did represent a fairly serious attempt to develop a powerful and coherent conservative-national project. However, the party proceeded to abandon the 'Fourth Republic' narrative -for example, by downplaying issues such as crime, corruption and the need for moral and political renewal in the 2011 election campaign 94 -which may have been justified on short-term electoral-strategic grounds, but risked damaging its longer-term cohesion and purposiveness.
At one point, it appeared that Law and Justice was trying to use the emotions surrounding the Smolensk tragedy, and concomitant portrayal of the late President Kaczyński as a national martyr, as a new 'mobilising myth' that could provide bind its supporters closer to the party. 95 This may have been effective as a means of mobilising the party's core electorate, and potentially even enough to secure election victory on the basis of low turnout. However, ultimately it was not enough to either provide the basis for short-term electoral success nor,
given that its effectiveness was sure to fade with time, act as a substitute integrative narrative capable of helping the party secure its longer-term survival. The danger for Law and Justice as it faced the difficult challenges of party renewal and coping with successive electoral defeats, which often trigger centrifugal forces within parties, was that it would transmogrify into a vehicle for its guru-like leader. For sure, Mr Kaczyński was a charismatic figure who generated an extremely loyal following on the Polish right, it was difficult to envisage the party's survival without him at its head, and even appeared impossible to build a successful right-wing formation in Poland that was not based on his leadership. However, except for the brief, exceptional period immediately after the Smolensk tragedy, he was also one of the country's least trusted and most un-popular politicians. The 2011 election appeared to confirm that Mr Kaczyński was a politician who had reached the limits of his electoral and political potential and thereby made his party un-electable. 96 The electoral success of the Palikot Movement, the other major development in this election, However, in practice the Democratic Left Alliance leadership was often prepared to compromise with the Catholic Church hierarchy, particularly when in government, and adopted a fairly pragmatic approach towards moral-cultural issues more generally. This was partly in order to achieve other objectives, such as ensuring that the Church maintained at least a neutral stance during the Polish EU accession process, and because radical anticlericalism on its own was not an election winning formula and felt to be a politically risky stance for a party that was trying to project a moderate self-image. 98 But it was also because the Democratic Left Alliance leadership did not want to alienate less well-off economically leftist voters who were either not interested in social liberalism or actually quite culturally conservative; and there were many of these even among those who were not particularly religious and felt that the Catholic Church played too prominent a role in public life. in support for sexual minorities and toleration of 'soft' drugs, together with business-friendly economic liberalism and support for a 'leaner' state. 101 All of this was pulled together into an over-arching electoral appeal based on a kind of 'libertarian modernisation' and communicated using a language and campaigning style particularly attractive to younger voters. On its own, this was not an election winning formula but it was a genuinely new phenomenon in Polish politics and a potentially significant enough constituency to provide the basis for a moderately successful political party. 102 However, given Mr Palikot's poor record as a parliamentarian 103 and the fact most of the new deputies that he brought into parliament had no political experience, 104 the longer term electoral (and even organisational survival) prospects for his Movement were not necessarily all optimistic ones. Some of his new MPs were controversial figures and potentially quite offputting to more moderate voters if they received greater exposure 105 while, other less ideologically committed ones, particularly among the generally pragmatic local entrepreneurs who were elected on the party's electoral lists, could be tempted to defect to Civic Platform as the perceived 'party of power'. Moreover, it was difficult to see a party with such a strongly pro-business outlook and committed to small-government flat-tax economic liberalism re-inventing itself convincingly enough to broaden its appeal to less well-off voters. 106 At the same time, although the Democratic Left Alliance's dismal showing clearly raised serious questions about whether it could remain a force in Polish politics it was too early to write off a party that retained a residual (although some would argue vestigial) 'core' of supporters including, as Table 3 shows, 58,500 paid up members 107 and around 1,000 local councillors. 108 This, together with the Palikot Movement's potential structural weaknesses and the limitations of its appeal, meant that, although the Alliance entered a period of crisis (possibly even an existential one), it was not inconceivable that it, or a party formed on its basis, would re-emerge as the major force on the Polish left.
Conclusion
The key to the Civic Platform's victory in the 2011 election was, therefore, its ability to Mr Palikot's electoral success was due partly to his ability to simply mobilise an existing anti-clerical electorate through a carefully targeted and intelligently executed campaign.
However, he combined this message with a broader appeal based on hostility to the political establishment, very explicit social liberalism, and support for a business-friendly 'leaner' state, and used a language and campaigning style that was particularly attractive to younger voters. This was not an election winning formula but it was a genuinely new phenomenon in Polish politics and potentially a significant enough constituency to provide a social base for a moderately successful political party. However, the Palikot Movement's potential structural weaknesses and the limitations of its appeal meant it was questionable whether this new party would be the long-term beneficiary of any revival on the Polish left. 
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